Martin Wolf has an excellent analysis of the probable causes of the current turmoil in the financial markets in his FT column this week. Was George Magnus right, he asks, to argue that we are facing a Minsky moment, with
a collapse of debt structures and entities in the wake of asset price
decay, the breakdown of ‘normal’ banking functions and the active
intervention of central banks?
Wolf argues that there are several contributory factors to the current crisis and people will pick the one, or combination, which suits their perception of how the economy works. But I was particularly interested by this:
a still less orthodox view is that man-made (fiat) money is inherently
unstable. All will then be solved when, as Mr Greenspan himself
believed, the world goes back on to gold. Human beings must, like
Odysseus, be chained to the mast of gold if they are to avoid repeated
monetary shipwrecks.
I think that the system of money creation upon which the economy rests is seriously implicated in the failure of markets and regulatory authorities to avoid the manic peaks and and depressing troughs that have plagued economies since the industrial revolution. Certainly there are other contributing factors, but these arise largely as a consequence of the way we allow private banking interests to create money at will, with the result that the exchange value represented by the total money supply has little to do with the quantity of wealth and wellbeing created through economic (and social) activity.
This argument is dealt with very well in Michael Rowbotham's excellent book: Grip of Death, and it is a theme I will explore in detail in my next book.
As for whether the Fed's dramatic decision to slash interest rates will have the desired effect, I'm with Larry Elliott who says today:
... make no mistake, the policy of slashing rates to rescue big finance
is both flawed and fraught with risk. The big flaw in the cheap money
approach is that it was too much cheap money that got the US (and
Britain, for that matter) into difficulties in the first place. If the
policy response to the collapse of one bubble is to blow up another
one, then that's an indication of intellectual bankruptcy.
Over at the Times, Anatole Kaletsky is more sanguine, although even he argues that some good old-fashioned fiscal intervention by governments will be necessary in order to make the Fed's monetary prescription effective.
As he concludes, it is impossible to say for certain yet what will happen. But one thing we do know for sure: a great deal of pain will be felt by many people. And, as ever, it will be the worst off that suffer most. Contraction in the job market, higher consumer prices and an increase in mortgage repossessions will hit millions of people, and there will also be a major impact on the public finances: quite how Gordon Brown is going to fund his pledge to build three million new homes after this, I'm not sure.
Only when there's a much more widespread appreciation of the flaws inherent in the modern financial system, will it be possible to create conditions in which the majority will enjoy real economic security.